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Shue v. State of Nevada, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 99 (Dec. 14, 2017)1 
 
CRIMINAL APPEAL: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY  
Summary  
 
The Nevada Supreme Court held that (1) under NRS 200.710(2), knowingly using a minor 
as the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, the proper unit of prosecution is one 
conviction per each distinct minor appearing as the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance; 
(2) under NRS 200.730, the “simultaneous possession at one time and place of [multiple] images 
depicting child pornography constituted a single violation of NRS 200.730”; (3) the statute barring 
the “sexual portrayals” of minors are not overbroad and do not violate the First Amendment or the 
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution because the statute is clearly defined to 
penalize only unprotected expression; and (4) the act of  kissing a minor on the mouth, in public, 
without consent, is insufficient to sustain a conviction of lewd conduct without further testimony 




Appellant Joshua Shue was convicted of child abuse and neglect,2 29 counts of use of a 
child in the production of pornography,3 10 counts of possession of visual representation 
depicting the sexual conduct of a child,4 and one count of open or gross lewdness.5 In 2010, Shue 
began periodically staying with his then-girlfriend and her three children H.I. (age 15), K.I. (age 
11), and F.I. (age 10).  
Over the course of two years, Shue periodically secretly videotaped H.I. and K.I. in the 
bathroom, fully nude, performing bathroom activities. A few of the videos capture both children 
on the same recording. In August 2012, Shue snuck up behind H.I. (age 17) and used a small digital 
camera to take a picture underneath her skirt. That same evening, Shue kissed H.I. on her mouth 
without her consent. In addition to the videos of H.I. and K.I., the police also found a “digital 
image of one young male fellating another young male” and “images of a boy with his genitalia 




Shue’s convictions under NRS 200.710(2) are not impermissibly redundant 
 
Shue argued that only one conviction should apply for each of the videos in which more 
than one minor is depicted. NRS 200.710(2) makes it a category A felony when a person 
“knowingly uses, encourages, entices, coerces or permits a minor to be the subject of a sexual 
portrayal in a performance.” After applying the rules of statutory interpretation and reviewing 
Casteneda v. State,6 the Court determined that the language “a minor” unambiguously denotes a 
                                                
1  By Molly Higgins  
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.508 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.710(2)  
4  NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.730 
5  NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.210 
6  132 Nev. Adv. Op. 44, 373 P.3d 108 (2016).  
singular object of offense and thus the proper unit of prosecution is each distinct minor appearing 
as the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance. Thus, Shue was properly convicted of 29 
counts of use of a child in the production of pornography.  
 
Shue is entitled to have 9 of his 10 convictions under NRS 200.730 vacated  
 
 Shue argued that 9 of his 10 convictions for possession of child pornography should be 
vacated because “the state did not prove that he possessed the disputed images and video files at 
different times or locations.” NRS 200.700 criminalizes the “knowing and willful possession of 
any film, photograph or other visual presentation” that depicts a minor under age 16 as the subject 
of sexual portrayal. After applying the rules of statutory interpretation and reviewing Casteneda v. 
State, the Court determined that the language “any” was ambiguous because it could mean “one 
or more.” In Casteneda, the Court applied the rule of lenity and determined that charges under 
NRS 200.730 could only be brought on a “per-possession” rather than a “per-image” basis and that 
“simultaneous possession at one time and place of [multiple] images depicting child pornography 
constituted a single violation.” Here, although each video was created on a different day there was 
insufficient evidence of distinct acts of possession because it was unclear whether Shue transferred 
each video to his computer every day, or whether he recorded for a long period of time and then 
transferred multiple videos to his computer at once. Therefore, the lower court improperly relied 
on a per-image basis rather than a per-possession basis and the Nevada Supreme Court vacated 9 
of Shue’s 10 convictions for possession of child pornography. 
 
Nevada’s statutes barring the “sexual portrayals” of minors do not violate the First Amendment 
or the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution  
 
Shue argued that the statutes criminalizing the production and possession of sexual 
portrayals of minors violate the First Amendment as unconstitutionally overbroad because there 
are circumstances in which visual portrayals of nude children should not be criminalized. NRS 
200.700(4) defines “sexual portrayal” as “the depiction of a person in a manner which appeals to 
prurient interest in sex and which does not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific 
value.” After reviewing the United States Supreme Court’s definition of “prurient” in Brockett v. 
Spokane Arcades, Inc.,7 the Nevada Supreme Court held that NRS 200.700(4) defines “sexual 
portrayal” as “depiction of a minor in a manner that appeals to a shameful or morbid interest in the 
sexuality of the minor”— a form of obscenity not protected under the First Amendment. Further, 
after reviewing Osborne v. Ohio,8 the Court determined that the phrase, “which does not have 
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value,” sufficiently limited the statutes operation to 
avoid penalizing all depictions of nude minors. Thus, the Court rejected Shue’s First Amendment 
and Due Process claims.  
 
There is insufficient evidence to support Shue’s open or gross lewdness conviction 
 
Shue argues that, by merely kissing H.I., he did not engage in open or gross lewdness under 
NRS 201.210. The Court determined that the definition of the phrase “lewd” pertained to “sexual 
conduct that is obscene or indecent” or conduct that is “evil, wicked or sexually unchaste or 
                                                
7  105 S. Ct. 2794, 472 U.S. 491 (1985).  
8  110 S. Ct. 1691, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).  
licentious.” Here, although Shue kissed H.I. without her consent, and although the kiss made H.I. 
feel uncomfortable and scared, there was insufficient evidence regarding the nature of the kiss for 
any reasonable trier of fact to find that the conduct was “lewd.” Thus, the Court reversed Shue’s 




The District Court properly convicted Shue for each minor depicted in each video file 
under NRS 200.710 and the Court affirmed all 29 counts of use of a child in the production of 
pornography.  
Because convictions for possession of images depiction the sexual portrayal of minors must 
be counted on a per-possession rather than a per-image basis, the Court determined that there was 
insufficient evidence to prove that Shue possessed each image at distinct or separate times and 
places. Therefore, the Court vacated 9 of the 10 possession convictions.  
Additionally, Nevada’s statutes that criminalize the production and possession of images 
depicting the sexual portrayal of minors are not overly broad and do not violate the First 
Amendment or Due Process Clause of the Constitution.  
Finally, the Court reversed Shue’s conviction of open or gross lewdness because there was 
insufficient evidence regarding the nature of the kiss for any reasonable trier of fact to find that 
the kiss was so lustful or sexually obscene to be considered “lewd.”  
